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ABSTRACT
The original Medicare Part D benefit included a gap in coverage, commonly
known as the “doughnut hole,” where beneficiaries were responsible for 100% of
drug costs. The Affordable Care Act included provisions to gradually close this
gap, beginning in 2011, in order to reduce the financial burden of drug spending
for Part D enrollees. Using a nationally representative survey of Medicare
beneficiaries, we examined the effect of this policy on out-of-pocket drug
spending and medication affordability. We found that the policy was associated
with a decrease in out-of-pocket spending. However, this trend was limited to
relatively healthy enrollees in stand-alone Part D plans. Surprisingly, measures of
medication affordability worsened after closure of the coverage gap. These
results highlight persistent problems of medication affordability in the Part D
program and underscore the need for policy makers to further address the
financial burden posed by medication costs.
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INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 created the Part D prescription
drug benefit. Part D was enacted in order to ease the financial burden on elderly
Medicare beneficiaries without drug coverage, especially those with chronic
health conditions and high out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses (1). Cost-related
nonadherence (CRN) to medications played a major role in the policy rationale
for a pharmacy benefit within the Medicare program. Before the implementation
of Part D, nearly half of low-income seniors in some states had no drug
coverage, and one-quarter of elderly Americans engaged in behaviors such as
not filling prescriptions due to cost, skipping doses or reducing doses to make
prescriptions last longer, and foregoing basic needs (such as food or heat) to
afford prescription drugs (1). In 2006, the first year that beneficiaries could
purchase a Part D plan, the policy began to have the desired effect: early
assessments of Part D showed a small but significant reduction in the prevalence
of CRN and foregoing basic needs to afford medicines (2).

One controversial component of the original Part D benefit was the coverage
gap, commonly known as the “doughnut hole.” The coverage gap was included in
the design of the program in order to make it more politically feasible, by
reducing the total 10-year cost of the benefit (3). Under the 2010 standard Part D
benefit, beneficiaries were responsible for 25% of drug spending up to an initial
coverage limit of $2,830. After hitting this threshold, they would fall into a
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coverage gap and had to pay the full cost of drugs until incurring $6,440 in total
drug spending, beyond which they qualified for catastrophic coverage. Once in
the catastrophic coverage phase, beneficiaries were responsible for only 5% of
drug spending. At the outset of the Part D program, one-third of beneficiaries
reached the coverage gap (3). Beneficiaries with the greatest need for
prescription drugs, especially those with chronic health conditions, were most
likely to be affected (4, 5). As might be expected, exposure to the coverage gap
was associated with a decrease in adherence to medications (6-9). For example,
one study found that 20% of beneficiaries who reached the gap either stopped
taking medications or reduced their medication use (10).

To address concerns about medication affordability in Part D, the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) included provisions to close the doughnut hole. The ACA aimed
to gradually reduce beneficiary cost-sharing in the coverage gap from 100% in
2010 to 25% in 2020 (3). The law required drug plans to pay a gradually
increasing share of total drug costs, and it mandated that manufacturers provide
a discount on brand name drugs. Starting in 2011, a 50% manufacturer discount
took effect for brand name pharmaceuticals. In 2013, insurers began to provide a
2.5% discount on brand names, increasing to 25% in 2020. The ACA also
required insurers to cover 7% of generic drug costs in the coverage gap in 2011,
increasing to 75% in 2020 (11). Of note, the ACA included a rule that the value of
these discounts would count in the calculation of beneficiaries’ OOP spending.
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While the ACA aimed to close the doughnut hole in 2020, Congress later chose
to accelerate this timeline. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 closed the
coverage gap one year earlier than originally planned for brand name drugs. In
2019, beneficiary coinsurance for brands was 25%, instead of 30% as scheduled
by the ACA; these savings for beneficiaries were offset by increasing the
manufacturer discount from 50% to 70% (3).

An early evaluation of the ACA doughnut hole policy showed a significant
reduction in OOP drug spending in the years when the gap began to close; the
change was most pronounced among beneficiaries with spending that reached
the doughnut hole (11). Despite this promising signal, other evidence suggests
persistent and worsening problems with medication affordability. Nationwide
rates of CRN among elderly Americans fell immediately after the closure of the
doughnut hole, but soon started to rise again (12). Among the sickest elderly
beneficiaries, CRN deteriorated in the years following the implementation of Part
D, worsening from 2007 to 2011 (13).

FUTURE OF PART D PROGRAM
Concern around high and rising drug prices has contributed to efforts by
policymakers to address the burden of medication affordability for seniors.
Between 2007 and 2017, Part D program costs increased from $46 billion to $80
billion (14). The fastest growing part of program spending is Medicare’s
reinsurance, which covers 80% of beneficiaries’ drug spending in the
catastrophic coverage phase of Part D. During the first decade of the Part D
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program, the portion of Medicare benefits paid to plans through reinsurance grew
from 25% to 54%. Enrollees who qualified for catastrophic coverage accounted
for 58% of all Part D spending in 2016, compared to 40% before 2011. Price
growth in specialty pharmaceuticals, with no generic or therapeutic alternatives,
partially explain these trends. In 2016, 336,000 Medicare beneficiaries had a
prescription for which a single fill cost enough to reach the catastrophic coverage
phase of Part D, compared to only 33,000 in 2010.

Unlimited OOP spending has become a point of concern for beneficiaries,
taxpayers, and policymakers. The last few years have seen several major
proposals to control drug prices and restructure the Part D program to rein in
spending by beneficiaries and the Medicare program (15). There are three major
redesigns currently being considered: the House Democratic caucus’s recently
passed H.R. 3, the Elijah Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act; the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) proposed redesign (16); and a
bipartisan proposal from the Senate Finance Committee (17). These plans all
shift spending in different ways for various payers and benefit phases (15). Of
note, the Trump Administration raised several proposals over the last few years
to reform the Medicare Part D benefit structure and the drug rebate system in
Part D; however, the Administration ultimately walked back or dropped these
plans (18).
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The House Democratic caucus’s bill includes a major redesign of the Part D
program. H.R. 3 places a cap on beneficiary OOP spending of $2,000 per year
and eliminates all cost-sharing above this amount (19). It also simplifies the Part
D benefit structure. For example, the bill requires manufacturers to discount
prices on brand name drugs by 10% for prescription medications filled before
beneficiaries reach the OOP threshold and by 30% for those filled after reaching
the OOP threshold. It also reduces Medicare’s share of spending when
beneficiaries reach the catastrophic coverage phase, by shifting the burden to
private Part D plans (20). Beyond changes to the Part D benefit structure, the
House bill also includes provisions that would authorize the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to negotiate prescription drug prices for both
Medicare and the private market.

Unlike H.R. 3, the Senate Finance Committee’s bipartisan plan does not enable
HHS to negotiate drug prices, but it does adjust the benefit structure of Part D
with the goal of controlling beneficiary spending (18). Under this proposal,
beneficiaries would pay a deductible and 25% coinsurance up to an OOP
threshold of $3,100. Manufacturers would provide a 20% discount on brand
name drugs after beneficiaries reach the OOP cap, instead of a 70% discount in
the coverage gap. The proposal also reduces Medicare’s share of spending in
the catastrophic coverage phase from 80% to 20% and increases the share paid
by private Part D plans from 15% to 60%.
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Like the other plans, the MedPac proposal includes a hard limit on OOP
spending. The proposal caps OOP expenditures at the current catastrophic
coverage threshold ($6,350) (16). However, it modifies the standard Part D
benefit by excluding the 70% manufacturer discount on brand name drugs
purchased in the coverage gap from the calculation of beneficiaries’ OOP
spending. In effect, this policy would require beneficiaries to spend more of their
own money in order to exceed the catastrophic coverage limit. Once they reach
this phase, however, they would incur no additional spending. Similar to the other
proposals being considered, the MedPac plan would lower Medicare’s share of
spending in the catastrophic coverage phase (from 80% to 20%), with private
Part D plans paying a greater share.

One key feature of all these proposals is that they shift spending from Medicare
to Part D plans in the catastrophic coverage phase (15). The goal is to address
concerns that Part D plans do not face sufficient incentives to control spending
for high-cost enrollees, as they are responsible for only a small share of spending
in the catastrophic coverage phase (21). If these changes were to take effect,
plans would likely increase premiums or reduce the generosity of their benefits in
order to offset their increased financial responsibility for high-cost enrollees.

COST-RELATED NONADHERENCE
One of the goals of Part D reform under the ACA was to limit OOP spending
among Medicare beneficiaries, in order to improve adherence to medications.
Issues with medication affordability rank among the top reasons why adults do
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not fill prescriptions or take their medications as prescribed (22). Unsurprisingly,
nonadherence is most prevalent among adults with chronic disease. The
Medicare population is particularly vulnerable to facing financial burden due to
high spending on prescription medications, as many live within modest means
and have multiple medical conditions. In 2016, for example, half of all Medicare
beneficiaries had incomes below $26,200 and savings below $74,450. Onequarter of all people on Medicare reported having fair or poor health, and over
one-fifth had at least five chronic conditions (23).

Failure to fill prescriptions or take medications due to cost has emerged as a
major public health concern over the last few decades. Early studies of
prescription medication nonadherence focused on individual-level strategies to
improve patient behaviors. They mainly suggested patient education and
provider vigilance as strategies to address nonadherence. In the mid-1990s,
health policy researchers and advocates began to turn their attention to an
increasingly important cause of nonadherence: the high cost of prescription
medications. Questions about CRN were added to several national health
surveys, including the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), the Medical
Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS), and the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS). These surveys allowed researchers to examine unmet need for
prescription medications. Studies began to examine the link between CRN and
public policies, including the Medicare Part D program (12, 24-27).
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Medication nonadherence is a complex behavior, with substantial medical and
financial risks. Objective financial measures, including OOP costs and income,
explain only part of an individual’s failure to adhere to medications (28, 29).
Some low-income individuals continue to take their medications as prescribed
despite substantial OOP costs, while other individuals with higher incomes and
assets engage in CRN. CRN depends not only on economic factors, but also
varies based on individual beliefs. For example, perceived need for medications
and concerns about potential side effects influence the likelihood of CRN (28).
Other factors linked to CRN include old age, chronic disease burden, and mood
disorders (30).

Nonadherence is a serious public health concern, as it places individuals at risk
for avoidable medical complications. Previous studies have found associations
between adherence and health outcomes across several chronic conditions. For
example, adherence to medications among individuals with chronic vascular
conditions—including congestive heart failure, hypertension, diabetes, and
dyslipidemia—reduces hospitalizations and emergency department use (31). For
individuals with diabetes, perceived financial burden and non-adherence are
associated with poor glucose control (32). Lack of money to afford insulin has
also been linked to over one-quarter of hospital admissions for diabetic
ketoacidosis (33). Among individuals with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
adherence to inhaled medications is associated with decreased risk of death and
hospital admissions due to exacerbations (34).
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Since the beginning of the Medicare Part D program, studies have examined the
impact of the pharmaceutical benefit on drug adherence. Much attention has
focused on the consequences of the Part D doughnut hole on medication
affordability and beneficiary behavior. The literature shows clearly that the
doughnut hole has a negative impact on adherence to prescription drugs. Using
claims data, Gu et al. demonstrated that beneficiaries with diabetes were less
likely to adhere to prescription medications after entering the Part D coverage
gap (35). Another study, which surveyed beneficiaries with diabetes who reached
the coverage gap, found that lack of “gap coverage” was associated with
nonadherence to insulin (36).

While much attention has focused on the effect of the coverage gap on
medication nonadherence, there is a gap in the literature regarding the impact of
closing the coverage gap on medication affordability. After closure of the gap
began in 2011, nationwide rates of CRN among elderly Americans fell, but soon
started to rise again (12). Among elderly beneficiaries with multiple chronic
conditions, CRN deteriorated in the years following the implementation of Part D,
worsening from 2007 to 2011 (13). A recent study using NHIS data found that
CRN reached 6.8% in 2017, nearly doubling since 2006 (3.6%), when Part D was
first implemented (37).
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MEDICARE EXPENDITURES
In 2017, outpatient prescription drugs made up 14% of overall Medicare
expenditures (23). In the coming decade, the average annual growth rate in
Medicare beneficiary costs is projected to increase, from 2.3% to 4.4% (38).
While government spending on Part D is substantial and likely to rise, part of the
rationale for originally implementing Part D was that it could reduce spending in
other areas of healthcare. Better access to prescription medications could
improve the health of beneficiaries with chronic disease, thereby decreasing
costly hospitalizations. These statements from the Congressional Record on
June 17, 2003, are emblematic of this line of thought (39):
“Now we find through research funded by Government, through research
funded by the drug companies, and products that have emerged from that
research, that many of the sicknesses you used to go to the hospital for
and stayed for 3 or 4 days can be taken care of by taking a pill. Yet
Medicare says if you go to the hospital and run up a bill of however many
tens of thousands of dollars to stay that many days, we will pay for it. But if
you take the pill that makes the hospital visit unnecessary, we will not.
That clearly doesn't make sense. There is the need for the benefit of
prescription drugs, and the Medicare system needs to catch up to
circumstance.” – Senator Robert Bennett, Republican, Utah
“There is a dramatic change in the pattern and practice of medicine.
Perhaps no better example is what happens with stomach illness. Twenty
years ago, there was not much one could do for somebody who suffered
from ulcers other than to have surgery. But now with prescription drugs
that address the underlying causes, stomach surgery has been reduced
by two‐thirds. Yet, in Medicare there is no coverage for those prescription
drugs. You can't have a modern Medicare without a prescription drug
component.” – Senator Kent Conrad, Democrat, North Dakota
Indeed, emerging evidence lends support to these arguments. Using Medicare
administrative data, Kaestner et al. showed that gaining prescription drug
insurance through Part D resulted in a 4% decrease in hospital admissions, a 2-
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5% decrease in Medicare inpatient payments, and a 10-15% decrease in
inpatient charges (39). Another study found that a $1 increase in prescription
drug spending was associated with a $2.06 decrease in Medicare spending; this
effect was greatest among low-income beneficiaries (40).

OUT-OF-POCKET DRUG EXPENDITURES
After implementation of Medicare Part D, OOP spending decreased significantly
for beneficiaries, by 18% to 49%, according to various estimates (41-44).
However, several studies have found that the presence of the doughnut hole
increased OOP spending for beneficiaries with chronic conditions requiring many
high-cost medications. For example, Patel et al. found that ESRD patients were
likely to face increased costs as a result of the Part D benefit, due to financial
exposure to medication costs in the coverage gap and above the catastrophic
coverage limit (45). In addition, a study of drug spending among Part D
beneficiaries with diabetes found that the coverage gap resulted in higher OOP
spending (6).

To date, there has been only one study that has examined the impact of closing
the doughnut hole on OOP spending. Using the MEPS, Tehrani et al. utilized a
difference-in-difference approach to examine the effect of closing the Medicare
Part D doughnut hole on OOP spending on prescription medications (11). They
found that closing the doughnut hole contributed to a $119 drop in OOP
spending. The difference was larger for beneficiaries with spending high enough
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to fall into the doughnut hole. The study attributed this drop in OOP expenditures
to decreased spending on brand name drugs. This result was likely due to the
50% manufacturer discount on brand name drugs mandated by the ACA, starting
in 2011.
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STUDY OBJECTIVES
In this study, we assess the effect of closing the Part D doughnut hole on
nationwide trends in CRN, foregoing basic needs to afford medicines, OOP drug
spending, and total drug spending. To our knowledge, there are no published
analyses that have directly attributed changes in CRN to the doughnut hole
closure. This paper is also the first to examine whether the ACA provisions had a
different effect on beneficiaries with standalone Part D plans (PDPs) versus
Medicare Advantage Part D plans (MAPDs). As fewer PDPs offer gap coverage
than MAPDs (46), it is possible that the ACA Part D provisions had a larger effect
on beneficiaries in PDPs. With one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in
Medicare Advantage plans (47), it is essential to understand whether the ACA
had a variable impact on beneficiaries in MAPDs versus PDPs.
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METHODS
DATA
We used the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) “Survey” and “Cost
Supplement” files from 2008-2015, with the exception of 2014, which was not
released by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Before 2015,
these were known as the “Access to Care” and “Cost and Use” files, respectively.
The MCBS is nationally representative of Medicare beneficiaries, both in the
community and in facility settings. The MCBS is a panel survey, enrolling
approximately 4,500 new beneficiaries each year. Beneficiaries remain in the
survey for up to four years, subject to death or loss to follow-up. Survey
respondents provide information regarding demographics, socioeconomic status,
health status, insurance, and spending. Health care use and spending
information is verified using receipts, explanation-of-benefit forms, and empty
prescription medication containers (48).

The survey also provides self-reported information on the presence of various
health conditions. We included indicators for the following chronic conditions:
heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, cancer (non-skin), stroke, arthritis,
dementia, psychiatric disorder, neurological disorder (excluding stroke), and
pulmonary disease (including asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease). We chose to include information on these diseases because they are
prevalent in the elderly population and can affect drug utilization and
expenditures.
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Our analysis included only community-dwelling Medicare beneficiaries over age
65. The sample was also limited to beneficiaries with a full year of drug coverage
of the same type. For example, if a beneficiary switched from employersponsored insurance to a PDP mid-year, that beneficiary would not be included
in our analysis. While this decision limited our sample size, it was necessary in
order to observe whether outcomes varied among beneficiaries with different
types of Part D coverage. We also excluded individuals who received the Part D
Low-Income Subsidy (LIS) in any month of the year, as LIS enrollees face no
coverage gap and thus should be unaffected by the ACA doughnut hole
provisions (14). Individuals with Medicaid but not LIS were also excluded.

OUTCOME MEASURES
The main outcome measures in our analysis were survey-reported CRN,
foregoing basic needs to afford medications, OOP drug spending, and total drug
spending.

The MCBS includes questions related to medication affordability, which have
been used (2, 13, 25, 26) and validated (49) in several previous studies. To
construct a composite measure of CRN (49), we used responses to questions
about how often beneficiaries had engaged in any of the following behaviors:
“decided not to fill a prescription because it cost too much”; “skipped doses to
make the medicine last longer”; “taken smaller doses than prescribed of a
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medicine to make the medicine last longer”; “delayed getting a prescription filled
because the medicine cost too much.” The possible answers were “often,”
“sometimes,” or “never.” We constructed a binary indicator of CRN. If
beneficiaries performed nonadherent behaviors “often” or “sometimes,” they were
classified as having CRN. Beneficiaries were also classified as having CRN if
they answered “yes” to another survey question—“were any medications
prescribed for you that you did not get”—and then reported cost as a reason for
this behavior. To better characterize the behaviors that contribute to CRN, we
present not only the composite measure of CRN, but also display two individual
measures of nonadherence: one indicated failure to fill a prescription due to cost,
and the other indicated skipping doses, taking smaller doses, or delaying refills.
In addition, we examined a separate outcome of whether beneficiaries took
extreme measures—foregoing basic needs, including food or heat—in order to
afford medicine.

We also calculated total drug spending and OOP drug spending for each
beneficiary using survey data on prescribed medication events. We excluded
prescribed medication events that were based only on administrative data rather
than survey-reported information. Analyses involving drug spending did not
include data from 2015. Imputation procedures for cost variables in the MCBS
were revised in 2015 (48), so cost data could not be compared reliably with prior
years. Costs were converted to 2015 US dollars using the all-items Consumer
Price Index (CPI).
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ANALYSIS
Our approach involved a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design to
evaluate the effect of the ACA Part D provisions on our study outcomes. Using
difference-in-difference regression models, we measured changes in these
outcomes between the pre-ACA period (2008–2010) and the post-ACA period
(2011–2015). The models sought to determine the impact of closing the
coverage gap on beneficiaries with Part D compared to beneficiaries with nonPart D drug coverage. The non-Part D beneficiaries were individuals with drug
coverage from employer-sponsored or retiree health insurance.

The equation below represents the basic structure of the regression models used
to estimate the effect of closing the coverage gap on medication affordability:

OUTCOME =β0 + β1 TIMEi + β2 TREATMENTit + β3 (TREATMENT*TIME)it +
β4 COVARIATESi + εit

where OUTCOME represents one of the outcome measures (e.g., CRN) for
beneficiary i in year t. TIME is a vector of year dummy variables, which is equal
to 1 for all beneficiaries surveyed in a given year. TREATMENT is a dummy
variable representing the Part D and non-Part D groups, which is equal to 1 for
all beneficiaries with Part D drug coverage. To estimate differences in outcomes
after the closure of the coverage gap, we included an interaction term between
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TREATMENT and TIME. Lastly, COVARIATES represents a vector of beneficiary
characteristics such as age, race, sex, perceived health status, income, and
number of chronic conditions.

We ran separate models for beneficiaries with PDPs and beneficiaries with
MAPDs. In addition, we also stratified the analysis by health status, based on
number of chronic conditions. We used a cutoff point of fewer than four versus
four or more chronic health conditions based on the distribution in the sample.
We chose to stratify based on number of chronic conditions rather than level of
spending, as spending could be endogenous to coverage gap policy; in other
words, the ACA Part D provisions might have spurred some beneficiaries to
spend more freely by reducing concern about cost-sharing in the gap.

To assess changes in binary outcomes—CRN and foregoing basic needs—we
created logistic regression models. For drug spending, we used a generalized
linear model with a gamma distribution and log link. All models controlled for age,
race and ethnicity, sex, marital status, education, census region, metro location,
income, self-reported health status, and death during the previous year. All
analyses accounted for complex survey design using annual cross-sectional
weights, strata, and primary sampling unit provided by MCBS. We did not correct
for clustering at the individual level due to repeated observations, as the need to
address this additional level of clustering is unclear if the primary sampling unit is
specified correctly (50). Further, we performed sensitivity analyses, addressing
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clustering at the individual level, which did not affect the significance or direction
of results. Stata statistical software, version 15, was used for all analyses.

LIMITATIONS
Our study has several limitations. First, self-reported information on concerns
surrounding medication affordability may be subject to reporting and recall bias,
in contrast to studies that examine nonadherence through pill counts, electronic
monitoring, or blood testing of drug levels. Second, drug spending can be
measured only until 2013, as the data from 2015 were determined using new
imputation methods, complicating comparisons to prior years. However, it is likely
that our analysis captured most of the change in OOP spending attributable to
the doughnut hole closure, as this time period saw the largest drop in beneficiary
cost-sharing in the coverage gap, especially for brand name drugs. Third, as with
any difference-in-difference analysis, there may be bias from unmeasured
variables that were changing differently among Part D beneficiaries versus nonPart D beneficiaries. For example, the ACA not only closed the coverage gap for
Part D beneficiaries, but also imposed a limit on total OOP expenses for
individuals in private health insurance plans, beginning in 2014 (51); this change
likely would have reduced OOP spending among beneficiaries with employersponsored private insurance without affecting Part D beneficiaries. However, our
analysis of OOP spending did not extend beyond 2013, so the ACA’s cap on
OOP expenses should not affect our findings. Lastly, our analysis does not
capture the final years of the Medicare Part D coverage gap closure. It is
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possible that the trends we observed do not accurately represent the end of the
decade.
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RESULTS
CHARACTERISTICS OF ELDERLY MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES
Our sample included 12,818 survey respondents in the pre-ACA period (years
2008–2010) and 17,560 in the post-ACA period (years 2011–2015) (Exhibit 1). In
the pre-ACA period, 4,388 Part D beneficiaries were enrolled in PDPs, whereas
2,867 were enrolled in MAPD plans. After the ACA, 7,137 beneficiaries were
enrolled in PDPs, and 5,015 were enrolled in MAPD plans. About one-quarter of
the beneficiaries in our sample reported having four or more chronic health
conditions. Our sample was mostly white, married, and located in metropolitan
areas. The majority had incomes 300% and above the federal poverty level. Of
note, a higher share of non-Part D beneficiaries (61.5% before ACA and 69.4%
after ACA) fell into this high-income group compared to Part D beneficiaries
(44.2% before ACA and 52.2% after ACA).

TRENDS IN OUTCOMES
Before the ACA Part D provisions took effect, Part D beneficiaries had higher
rates of CRN compared with non-Part D beneficiaries (Exhibit 2). In the pre-ACA
period, the prevalence of CRN was higher among PDP beneficiaries (11.4%)
than MAPD beneficiaries (9.2%) (Exhibit 5). After the ACA took effect, CRN
increased for beneficiaries with PDP or MAPD coverage, as well as for those with
non-Part D drug coverage (Exhibit 5). In the difference-in-difference analyses,
the coverage gap policy was not associated with a significant change in CRN
(Exhibit 5).
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Our findings were similar for our other measure of medication affordability:
foregoing basic needs to afford medicine. Before the ACA Part D provisions took
effect, Part D beneficiaries had higher rates of foregoing basic needs to afford
medicines compared with non-Part D beneficiaries (Exhibit 3). Before the ACA,
the prevalence of foregoing basic needs was higher for PDP enrollees (3.5%)
than MAPD enrollees (2.6%) (Exhibit 5). After the coverage gap began to close,
the prevalence of foregoing basic needs increased for MAPD and non-Part D
beneficiaries (Exhibit 5). There was no significant change in foregoing basic
needs among PDP beneficiaries. In the difference-in-difference analysis, the
coverage gap policy was not associated with a significant change in foregoing
basic needs.

OOP drug spending was higher among Part D beneficiaries than non-Part D
beneficiaries during the pre-ACA period (Exhibit 4). Spending was higher for PDP
enrollees ($905) than for MAPD plan enrollees ($588) (Exhibit 5). After the
coverage gap began to close, OOP drug spending decreased for PDP enrollees,
but not for MAPD enrollees. According to our difference-in-difference analysis,
the ACA Part D provisions were associated with a decrease in OOP spending for
Part D enrollees versus non-Part D enrollees.

Total drug spending was higher among PDP enrollees ($2,699) than MAPD
enrollees ($2,077) during the pre-ACA period. After the coverage gap began to
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close, there was no significant change in total drug spending, and the differencein-difference analysis showed no significant change in total drug spending as a
result of closing the coverage gap.

CHANGES IN MEDICATION AFFORDABILITY BY DISEASE BURDEN
Across the entire study period, rates of CRN and foregoing basic needs, as well
as OOP drug spending, were higher for beneficiaries with four or more chronic
health conditions compared to healthier elderly beneficiaries (Exhibit 5). After the
ACA Part D provisions took effect, CRN increased among healthier Part D
beneficiaries. Among sicker beneficiaries, however, the prevalence of CRN did
not increase significantly for PDP enrollees; in fact, difference-in-difference
analysis showed that the ACA Part D provisions were associated with a decrease
in CRN for this group.

The prevalence of foregoing basic needs to afford medicines increased after the
ACA took effect for PDP and MAPD enrollees with four or more chronic health
conditions. Among healthier Part D beneficiaries, we found a significant increase
in the rate of foregoing basic needs for healthier MAPD enrollees but not for PDP
enrollees. Difference-in-difference analyses found no significant change in
foregoing basic needs associated with closing the coverage gap.

Among beneficiaries with fewer than four chronic health conditions, OOP drug
spending fell by $146 for PDP enrollees after the ACA coverage gap provisions
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took effect. There was no significant change in OOP spending among healthier
MAPD enrollees over this time period. Difference-in-difference analysis showed
that the ACA Part D provisions were associated with a significant fall in OOP
drug spending for healthier PDP beneficiaries; however, it was not associated
with any significant change in OOP drug spending for sicker beneficiaries with
any type of Part D coverage.

PARALLEL TRENDS TEST
A key assumption of difference-in-difference design is that the outcome in the
treatment and control groups would follow the same trend in the absence of any
intervention. To test this assumption, we used data from before implementation
of the ACA (from 2010 and earlier). We reran all difference-in-difference models
that were part of our main analysis, but with different time periods constituting our
pre- and posttreatment groups. First, we ran the analysis with 2008 as the
pretreatment period and 2009/2010 as the posttreatment period; we then
repeated all analyses with 2008/2009 as the pretreatment period and 2010 as the
posttreatment period. Out of 108 regressions, only 2 produced a statistically
significant interaction term between the treatment (Part D) and time variables
(Exhibits 6-7). These results suggest that, in the absence of the ACA, the study
outcomes would have exhibited similar trends among Part D and non-Part D
beneficiaries.
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DISCUSSION
We investigated the effect of the ACA Medicare Part D coverage gap provisions
on medication affordability. The Part D coverage gap, commonly known as the
doughnut hole, began to close in 2011. In response to this policy change, we
expected to observe a drop in CRN, foregoing basic needs to afford medicine,
and OOP drug spending. Instead, our results revealed a mixed picture. We
discovered that OOP drug spending fell among Part D enrollees as a result of
closing the coverage gap. However, in subgroup analyses, this drop in OOP
spending was observed only among PDP enrollees, not among those in MAPD
plans. In addition, we found persistent and worsening problems surrounding
medication affordability for Part D beneficiaries: in the early years after the ACA
Part D provisions first took effect, we were surprised to find a rising prevalence of
CRN and foregoing basic needs to afford medicines.

These seemingly contradictory findings suggest that the benefits of Part D
coverage gap cost-sharing reductions may be relatively limited in their reach. We
found a significant drop in OOP drug spending as a consequence of the new
policy only among beneficiaries with PDPs; spending remained stable for those
with MAPD plans. It not surprising that the coverage gap provisions had less
impact for MAPD plan enrollees. In contrast to PDPs, MAPD plans tend to offer
more generous coverage, as they can use a portion of their Medicare Advantage
(Part C) payments in order to enhance the drug benefit, by lowering premiums
and deductibles, or by providing enhanced protections for enrollees in the
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coverage gap (14). For this reason, a higher proportion of MAPD plans offer gap
coverage than PDPs (53% versus 14% in 2017, respectively). Compared with
PDP enrollees, MAPD plan enrollees likely faced less financial exposure while in
the coverage gap and thus had less to gain from the ACA Part D provisions.

When we divided our sample even further, based on the number of chronic
health conditions, we found a significant drop in OOP drug spending only among
healthier PDP enrollees. It is possible that this group represents individuals
whose spending fell below or within the coverage gap but did not reach the
catastrophic coverage limit. Our finding that OOP spending fell among healthier
PDP enrollees suggests that coverage gap provisions helped to alleviate the
burden of drug costs for people with lower levels of spending. The expiration of
drug patents and expanded use of generics during our study period also probably
contributed to this trend (14).

Unfortunately, the improvement in OOP drug spending did not extend to the
sickest PDP enrollees. It is possible that rising drug costs may have risen
disproportionately for sick beneficiaries over our study period, offsetting reduced
cost-sharing in the coverage gap. For example, prices of oral anticancer
medications increased at a quicker pace than inflation between 2010 and 2018,
leading to rising OOP drug costs for most Part D enrollees taking these
medications, despite the closure of the coverage gap (52). An analysis of
Medicare beneficiaries who take at least one high cost specialty drug found a
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26% decrease in annual OOP expenditures below the catastrophic coverage limit
from 2008 to 2012, likely as a result of the ACA Part D provisions; however,
increased expenditures while in the catastrophic coverage mostly offset the
impact of this policy change (53). Moreover, while closing the coverage gap has
probably reduced expenditures for some beneficiaries taking specialty
medications, they still face a high OOP spending burden (54).

Our finding that rates of CRN and foregoing basic needs worsened among Part D
beneficiaries is consistent with prior evaluations (12, 13). However, this analysis
is unique, as it takes the approach of a difference-in-difference analysis—to
attribute any trends to policy changes around Part D. The decline in indicators of
medication affordability between the pre-ACA period (2008–2010) and the postACA period (2011–2015) is striking, especially as the pre-ACA period coincides
with the Great Recession. These trends may reflect changes in Part D plan
benefits that occurred over our study period. For instance, premiums for
Medicare PDPs increased in the initial years of the benefit, but then remained
relatively flat since 2010; MAPD premiums have risen modestly in past few years
(55). Use of a deductible by stand-alone PDPs was also higher toward the end of
our study period compared to the first few years of the Part D programs. While
these changes may have aimed to control costs and direct patients toward less
expensive pharmaceuticals, they might have had the unintended consequence of
reducing adherence.
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These trends might also be the result of a rise in the number of beneficiaries who
reach the coverage gap (3). The amount of total drug spending to reach the
coverage gap (also known as the initial coverage limit) has increased since 2011,
based on annual increases in the rate of growth of Part D per capita costs.
Relatively modest increases in the coverage limit have resulted in more
beneficiaries reaching the gap than in prior years. In late 2013, expensive
medications to treat hepatitis C entered the market, also contributing to more
beneficiaries reaching the gap. In addition, over our study period, more
beneficiaries started reaching the catastrophic coverage phase of the Part D
benefit. In the past, most enrollees who qualified for catastrophic coverage were
shielded from unlimited spending by the low-income subsidy; however, a rising
number of beneficiaries are achieving this level of spending without any such
protection (53).

Our analysis calls attention to the mixed success of closing the Part D coverage
gap and highlights a need for further policy changes to address the burden of
medication affordability for Part D beneficiaries. Given scheduled changes to the
Part D benefit that have taken effect this year, these problems are likely to
worsen if no additional changes are made. A provision of the ACA temporarily
restrained increases in the OOP threshold—the spending cap above which
catastrophic coverage begins—but expired this year, leading to a 20% increase
in the OOP threshold (14). This change corresponds to an estimated rise in OOP
spending of $1,250 (3). The Part D program is also facing the possibility of
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proposed changes that would increase OOP costs for enrollees. The coverage
gap cost-sharing reductions are mostly financed by manufacturer discounts,
which are counted toward the calculation of beneficiary OOP spending. In one of
its past proposals, the Trump Administration has considered excluding these
discounts from calculating beneficiary OOP spending, which would increase
OOP costs for enrollees and result in fewer beneficiaries qualifying for
catastrophic coverage.

Based on our findings, now is not the time to increase costs for elderly
beneficiaries, who already face persistent problems affording medicines. Policy
makers should consider strategies to lessen the financial burden of drug
spending for Part D beneficiaries, especially the sickest enrollees with the
greatest OOP costs. One possibility is to institute a cap on OOP spending for
Part D enrollees (14, 53). A cap has been proposed in various forms by the
Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC), the Trump Administration,
and the Senate Finance Committee (15, 56). An analysis of a hypothetical OOP
spending limit found that such a policy would increase monthly Part D premiums
by $0.40 – $1.31 per member (53).
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CONCLUSION
As a result of closing the Medicare Part D coverage gap, OOP drug spending
declined among Part D beneficiaries. However, this change was limited to
healthier beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs. In addition, our study period saw an
increase in CRN and foregoing basic needs to afford medicines, despite Part D
policy changes intended to bring down costs for enrollees. Our findings highlight
the mixed success of ACA Part D provisions in improving the financial burden of
affording medications for elderly beneficiaries. There is a pressing need to make
further improvements to the Part D program, especially as changes to the benefit
structure in 2020 will result in increased OOP spending for enrollees who already
face a high level of drug spending.
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EXHIBITS
Exhibit 1. Characteristics of Medicare beneficiaries before and after the Affordable Care Act Part D coverage gap provisions
took effect
Non-Part D
N (unweighted)
N (weighted)
Age A, B, D
66-69
70-74
75-79
80 and above
Male A, B
Race/ethnicity A, B, D
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Education A, B, C, D
Less than high school
High school
More than high school
Census B, C
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Married A, B, C
Metro

Before ACA
Any Part D
PDP

MAPD

Non-Part D

After ACA
Any Part D
PDP

MAPD

5,563
24,024,433

7,255
30,687,330

4,388
18,231,281

2,867
12,456,049

5,408
26,992,947

12,152
59,549,654

7,137
34,215,633

5,015
25,334,022

23.3%
26.3%
20.5%
29.9%
45.3%

20.4%
28.1%
21.8%
29.6%
37.5%

19.3%
28.3%
21.6%
30.8%
35.8%

22.0%
27.9%
22.2%
27.8%
40.1%

25.7%
26.9%
19.7%
27.8%
47.3%

22.3%
29.8%
21.0%
26.9%
37.7%

22.0%
29.2%
20.8%
28.1%
36.9%

22.6%
30.7%
21.3%
25.4%
38.8%

87.1%
5.7%
3.5%
3.8%

87.1%
4.5%
5.4%
3.1%

91.5%
3.0%
3.3%
2.2%

80.5%
6.7%
8.6%
4.3%

86.2%
6.3%
4.0%
3.6%

85.2%
5.1%
6.1%
3.7%

89.2%
4.1%
3.5%
3.2%

79.7%
6.4%
9.5%
4.4%

13.1%
28.5%
58.5%

18.0%
33.7%
48.3%

17.0%
34.0%
49.1%

19.6%
33.4%
47.0%

10.2%
24.8%
65.0%

14.2%
28.5%
57.3%

11.9%
27.3%
60.8%

17.2%
30.3%
52.5%

19.5%
25.7%
36.5%
18.3%
62.8%
77.7%

18.8%
25.8%
32.9%
22.6%
57.3%
79.4%

18.3%
28.9%
37.4%
15.5%
55.7%
71.0%

19.5%
21.2%
26.3%
33.0%
59.7%
91.6%

18.1%
20.8%
38.8%
22.3%
65.6%
79.1%

19.0%
25.8%
32.9%
22.4%
58.2%
79.5%

17.9%
29.8%
35.5%
16.9%
58.2%
72.8%

20.5%
20.4%
29.3%
29.9%
58.2%
88.6%
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Before ACA
Non-Part D
Federal Poverty Level (%) A, B, C, D
0-99.9%
100-149.9%
150-299.9%
300% and above
General Health A, B, C, D
Excellent
Very good
Good
Fair
Poor
Chronic Health Conditions D
4 or more

Any Part D

After ACA
PDP

MAPD

Non-Part D

Any Part D

PDP

MAPD

2.7%
4.9%
30.8%
61.5%

5.5%
10.9%
39.5%
44.2%

5.4%
10.5%
38.2%
45.9%

5.5%
11.5%
41.4%
41.6%

2.1%
4.7%
23.9%
69.4%

4.1%
9.1%
34.6%
52.2%

4.0%
8.0%
31.6%
56.4%

4.3%
10.7%
38.6%
46.5%

19.2%
35.4%
31.0%
11.8%
2.6%

16.0%
34.3%
32.9%
13.3%
3.4%

17.0%
34.3%
33.3%
13.3%
3.8%

17.4%
34.4%
32.4%
13.4%
2.8%

19.0%
37.0%
28.4%
11.0%
2.3%

19.7%
36.6%
30.1%
11.2%
3.1%

18.9%
36.5%
30.5%
10.8%
3.3%

19.1%
36.7%
29.6%
11.7%
3.0%

25.1%

23.4%

24.2%

22.2%

25.5%

26.5%

27.5%

25.1%

Non-Part D beneficiaries are mostly individuals with employer-sponsored insurance.
Values represent column percentages.

A.
B.
C.
D.

p-value < 0.05 for any Part D plan versus non-Part D; chi-square test included only data from before the ACA.
p-value < 0.05 for any Part D plan versus non-Part D; chi-square test included only data from after the ACA.
p-value < 0.05 for before ACA versus after ACA; chi-square test included only data from non-Part D beneficiaries.
p-value < 0.05 for before ACA versus after ACA; chi-square test included only data from beneficiaries with any Part D plan.
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Exhibit 2. Unadjusted prevalence of cost-related nonadherence, 2008-2015
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Exhibit 3. Unadjusted prevalence of foregoing basic needs to afford medicine
among Medicare beneficiaries, 2008-2015
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Exhibit 4. Unadjusted out-of-pocket drug spending among Medicare beneficiaries,
2008-2015
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Exhibit 5. Adjusted estimates of cost-related nonadherence, foregoing basic
needs to afford medicines, and out-of-pocket drug spending before and after
Affordable Care Act closed the Part D coverage gap
Model

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post

Difference in
difference

OVERALL
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

10.6%
11.4%
9.2%

2.8%**
2.0%**
3.8%**

1.9%**
1.8%**
1.9%**

0.9%
0.2%
1.9%

8.4%
8.7%
7.7%

1.3%**
0.8%
2.0%*

1.1%*
1.0%*
1.1%*

0.3%
-0.2%
0.9%

5.8%
6.4%
4.6%

2.4%**
1.8%**
3.3%**

1.3%**
1.2%**
1.3%**

1.2%
0.6%
2.1%

3.4%
3.5%
2.6%

1.1%**
0.7%
2.2%**

0.8%*
0.7%*
0.8%*

0.4%
-0.1%
1.4%

$781
$905
$588

-$65**
-$113**
$3

-$12
-$31*
-$24

-$53*
-$82
$27

$2,436
$2,699
$2,077

$23
-$78
-$18

-$12
-$73
-$50

$35
-$5
$32

8.8%
9.3%
8.0%

2.3%**
1.6%*
3.2%**

0.8%
0.7%
0.8%

1.5%
0.9%
2.4%

7.0%
7.1%
6.7%

0.8%
0.3%
1.5%

-0.2%
-0.2%
-0.2%

1.0%
0.5%
1.7%

Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

0 to 3 CHRONIC HEALTH CONDITIONS
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

45
Model

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post

Difference in
difference

Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

4.6%
5.0%
3.7%

2.0%**
1.3%*
2.8%**

1.1%**
1.1%**
1.2%**

0.9%
0.2%
1.7%

2.5%
2.9%
1.9%

0.4%
-0.3%
1.2%*

0.3%
0.3%
0.3%

0.1%
-0.6%
0.9%

$657
$771
$488

-$94**
-$146**
-$23

-$14
-$30*
-$24

-$80**
-$116**
$1

$2,083
$2,077
$1,726

-$172
-$18
-$141

-$69
-$50
-$73

-$102
$32
-$68

16.7%
18.5%
13.3%

3.0%**
1.6%
5.1%**

4.6%**
4.4%**
4.7%**

-1.6%
-2.9%*
0.4%

13.3%
14.2%
11.3%

1.8%
1.0%
2.8%

4.3%**
4.1%**
4.5%**

-2.5%*
-3.1%*
-1.6%

10.0%
11.2%
7.7%

2.8%**
2.0%
4.3%**

1.3%
1.3%
1.3%

1.5%
0.7%
3.0%

5.6%
5.7%
5.2%

3.6%**
2.6%**
4.4%**

1.9%*
1.9%*
1.7%*

1.7%
0.8%
2.7%

$1,207
$1,359

-$60
-$85

-$37
-$47

-$23
-$39

Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

4 OR MORE CHRONIC HEALTH
CONDITIONS
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
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Model

MAPD versus Non-Part D

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post
$957
$16

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post
-$42

Difference in
difference
$58

$9
-$69
-$61

$335
$389
$103

Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

$3,651
$3,895
$3,354

$344
$320
$42

a) Cost-related nonadherence is a composite measure that refers to the following
behaviors: decided not to fill a prescription because it cost too much; skipped
doses to make the medicine last longer; took smaller doses than prescribed of a
medicine to make the medicine last longer; delayed getting a prescription filled
because the medicine cost too much.
b) Non-Part D beneficiaries receive drug benefits mainly through employersponsored insurance.
c) Models included the following covariates: age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status,
education, census region, metropolitan area, income, self-reported health status,
and indicator for full year of data.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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Appendix Exhibit 6. Parallel trends test, 2008 versus 2009 and 2010
Model

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post

Difference in
difference

OVERALL
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

10.7%
11.0%
9.8%

0.0%
0.7%
-0.9%

0.5%
0.5%
0.5%

-0.5%
0.3%
-1.4%

8.2%
8.3%
7.8%

0.4%
0.7%
-0.2%

0.2%
0.2%
0.2%

0.1%
0.6%
-0.4%

6.1%
6.5%
5.3%

-0.3%
0.1%
-0.8%

0.7%
0.7%
0.7%

-1.0%
-0.5%
-1.5%

4.2%
4.2%
3.9%

-1.2%*
-0.7%
-1.7%**

-0.3%
-0.3%
-0.3%

-0.9%
-0.4%
-1.4%

$785
$895
$586

$7
$19
-$6

$15
$7
$12

-$9
$12
-$18

$2,364
$2,550
$2,010

$143
$194
$85

$16
-$25
-$9

$126
$218
$94

9.2%
9.0%

-0.3%
0.7%

0.6%
0.6%

-1.0%
0.1%

Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

0 to 3 CHRONIC HEALTH CONDITIONS
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
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Model

MAPD versus Non-Part D

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post
9.0%
-1.6%

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post
0.6%

Difference in
difference
-2.2%

Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

7.1%
6.9%
7.0%

-0.1%
0.5%
-0.8%

0.2%
0.2%
0.2%

-0.3%
0.4%
-1.0%

5.1%
5.1%
4.7%

-0.6%
0.1%
-1.3%

0.9%
0.9%
0.9%

-1.5%*
-0.8%
-2.2%*

3.4%
3.9%
2.5%

-1.1%*
-1.2%
-0.9%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

-1.1%
-1.2%
-0.9%

$668
$771
$490

-$6
$6
-$11

$8
$3
$7

-$14
$3
-$18

$2,008
$2,010
$1,697

$141
$85
$46

-$6
-$9
-$28

$147
$94
$74

16.2%
17.6%
12.6%

0.5%
0.7%
1.1%

0.2%
0.2%
0.3%

0.3%
0.6%
0.8%

12.2%
12.7%

1.4%
1.5%

0.3%
0.2%

1.1%
1.3%

Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

4 OR MORE CHRONIC HEALTH
CONDITIONS
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
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Model

MAPD versus Non-Part D

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post
10.3%
1.6%

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post
0.5%

Difference in
difference
1.1%

Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

9.9%
10.9%
7.0%

0.0%
0.2%
1.0%

0.2%
0.2%
0.2%

-0.2%
0.0%
0.8%

6.9%
5.4%
9.1%

-1.5%
0.8%
-5.1%**

-1.0%
-1.1%
-1.0%

-0.4%
1.9%
-4.1%

$1,197
$1,336
$954

$18
$37
-$13

$16
$1
$7

$2
$36
-$20

$3,640
$3,773
$3,279

$47
$151
$47

-$54
-$117
-$65

$101
$268
$112

Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

a) Cost-related nonadherence is a composite measure that refers to the following
behaviors: decided not to fill a prescription because it cost too much; skipped
doses to make the medicine last longer; took smaller doses than prescribed of a
medicine to make the medicine last longer; delayed getting a prescription filled
because the medicine cost too much.
b) Non-Part D beneficiaries receive drug benefits mainly through employersponsored insurance.
c) Models included the following covariates: age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status,
education, census region, metropolitan area, income, self-reported health status,
and indicator for full year of data.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.

50
Appendix Exhibit 7. Parallel trends test, 2008 and 2009 versus 2010
Model

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post

Difference in
difference

OVERALL
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

10.6%
11.2%
9.4%

0.4%
1.1%
-0.7%

0.7%
0.6%
0.7%

-0.3%
0.5%
-1.4%

8.1%
8.3%
7.6%

1.0%
1.5%
0.3%

0.5%
0.4%
0.5%

0.5%
1.0%
-0.2%

6.0%
6.5%
5.0%

-0.3%
0.1%
-0.8%

0.3%
0.3%
0.3%

-0.6%
-0.2%
-1.1%

3.5%
3.7%
2.9%

-0.3%
0.1%
-0.7%

-0.1%
-0.1%
-0.1%

-0.1%
0.2%
-0.6%

$805
$931
$588

-$46*
-$67*
-$20

-$20
-$36*
-$30*

-$25
-$31
$11

$2,498
$2,707
$2,111

-$112
-$77
-$135

-$244**
-$329**
-$305**

$132
$253
$170

8.8%
9.0%

0.3%
1.4%

0.1%
0.1%

0.2%
1.3%

Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

0 to 3 CHRONIC HEALTH CONDITIONS
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
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Model

MAPD versus Non-Part D

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post
8.3%
-1.4%

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post
0.1%

Difference in
difference
-1.5%

Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

6.6%
6.6%
6.5%

1.2%
2.0%*
0.0%

0.0%
-0.1%
0.0%

1.2%
2.0%
0.1%

4.9%
5.2%
4.3%

-0.7%
0.1%
-1.7%*

0.3%
0.3%
0.3%

-1.0%
-0.2%
-1.9%

2.9%
3.3%
2.1%

-0.6%
-0.5%
-0.8%

0.2%
0.2%
0.2%

-0.8%
-0.7%
-1.0%

$680
$801
$488

-$48*
-$74*
-$19

-$9
-$22
-$17

-$39
-$52
-$2

$2,129
$2,111
$1,759

-$81
-$135
-$100

-$164*
-$305**
-$227**

$83
$170
$128

16.5%
18.1%
13.2%

0.2%
-0.2%
0.5%

2.3%
2.2%
2.5%

-2.2%
-2.4%
-1.9%

13.1%
13.7%

0.0%
-0.1%

2.1%
1.9%

-2.1%
-2.0%

Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

4 OR MORE CHRONIC HEALTH
CONDITIONS
Cost-related Nonadherence
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Skipping/Delaying/Taking Smaller Doses
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
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Model

MAPD versus Non-Part D

Part D
Change from
Pre ACA
pre to post
11.4%
0.0%

Non-Part D
Change from
pre to post
2.2%

Difference in
difference
-2.2%

Not Filling Prescription
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

9.7%
11.0%
7.2%

0.6%
0.1%
1.6%

0.5%
0.4%
0.5%

0.1%
-0.3%
1.0%

5.7%
5.3%
5.7%

0.7%
2.0%
-0.8%

-1.1%
-1.1%
-1.0%

1.8%
3.1%
0.2%

$1,227
$1,377
$960

-$52
-$49
-$47

-$58
-$68*
-$62*

$6
$19
$15

$3,761
$3,897
$3,426

-$266
-$72
-$347

-$479**
-$491**
-$465**

$213
$418
$118

Foregoing Basic Needs
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
OOP Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D
Total Drug Spending
Any Part D versus Non-Part D
PDP versus Non-Part D
MAPD versus Non-Part D

a) Cost-related nonadherence is a composite measure that refers to the following
behaviors: decided not to fill a prescription because it cost too much; skipped
doses to make the medicine last longer; took smaller doses than prescribed of a
medicine to make the medicine last longer; delayed getting a prescription filled
because the medicine cost too much.
b) Non-Part D beneficiaries receive drug benefits mainly through employersponsored insurance.
c) Models included the following covariates: age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status,
education, census region, metropolitan area, income, self-reported health status,
and indicator for full year of data.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.

